Abstract. We present new careful semantics within Dung's theory of argumentation. Under such careful semantics, two arguments cannot belong to the same extension whenever one of them indirectly attacks a third argument while the other one indirectly defends the third. We argue that our semantics lead to a better handling of controversial arguments than Dung's ones in some settings. We compare the careful inference relations induced by our semantics w.r.t. cautiousness; we also compare them with the inference relations induced by Dung's semantics.
Introduction
Argumentation is a general approach to model defeasible reasoning, in which the two main issues are the generation of arguments and their exploitation so as to draw some conclusions based on the way arguments interact (see e.g., [1] [2] [3] [4] ).
Among the various theories of argumentation pointed out so far (see e.g., [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] ) is Dung's theory [5] . Dung's theory is quite influential since it encompasses many approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning and logic programming as special cases; as such, it has been refined and extended by several authors, including [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] . In Dung's approach, no assumption is made about the nature of an argument. Dung's theory of argumentation is not concerned with the generation of arguments; arguments and the way they interact w.r.t. the attack relation are considered as initial data of any argumentation framework, which can thus be viewed as a labeled digraph.
Several inference relations can be defined within Dung's theory. Usually, inference is defined at the argument level: an argument is considered derivable from an argumentation framework ¡ £ ¢ when it belongs to one (credulous consequence) (resp. all (skeptical consequence)) extensions of ¡ £ ¢ under some semantics, where an extension of ¡ £ ¢ is an admissible set of arguments (i.e., a conflict-free and self-defending set) that is maximal for a given criterion (made precise by the semantics under consideration). While skeptical derivability can be safely extended to the level of sets of arguments, this is not the case for credulous derivability. Indeed, it can be the case that arguments ¤ and ¥ are (individually) derivable from an argumentation framework ¡ ¦ ¢ of arguments as inclusion into some (resp. all) extensions under Dung's semantics does not always lead to expected conclusions.
Consider the following scenario: in a public meeting, a political activist presents the motivations of her policy using arguments and counter-arguments: "One should really decrease taxes (a); of course, this requires to cut staff in public services (b) , but that is not so dramatic: privatizing some activities will lead to better services since free trading is good for it (c); furthermore, I am confident that we should reduce our economical exchanges with other foreign countries (d); this is antagonistic to promoting free trading, but, anyway, the productivity of our public services is definitely bad (e)". This sounds quite strange as a political speech since the speaker admits that she is in favour of conflicting arguments; a political opponent could easily point out the presence of such a conflict and concludes that such a policy is just non-sense; in order to convince the audience that One way to cope with this problem is to ask for more demanding notions of absence of conflicts than the one considered in Dung's theory. In this paper, we define and study new semantics for Dung's framework based on the idea that an admissible set 2 of arguments should not include controversies, i.e. it should not be the case that an element corresponds to the notion of controversial arguments, as introduced by Dung. While some controversial arguments can be inferred using Dung's standard semantics, they are systematically rejected when our careful semantics are considered.
We believe that such prudent semantics can prove helpful to reason with arguments from domains like politics or justice, where a strong notion of "coherence" on the sets of arguments pointed out makes sense.
In the following, we compare the inference relations induced by our new semantics with Dung's ones and show that in many cases one obtains more cautious notions of derivability.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first recall the main definitions and results pertaining to Dung's theory of argumentation. Then, we present our new, careful semantics for argumentation frameworks. In a third section, a comparison of the various notions of acceptability (including Dung's ones) is provided. A final section concludes the paper and gives a few perspectives.
Dung's Theory of Argumentation
Let us present some basic definitions at work in Dung's theory of argumentation [5] . We restrict them to finite argumentation frameworks. Clearly enough, the set of finite argumentation frameworks is a proper subset of the set of Dung's finitary argumentation frameworks, where every argument must be attacked by finitely many arguments. The definition above clearly shows that a finite argumentation framework is nothing but a finite, labeled digraph.
The main issue is the inference one, i.e., charactering the sets of arguments which could be reasonably derived from a given argumentation framework. Formally, we shall note In order to define a notion of extension, a first important notion is the notion of acceptability: an argument ¤ is acceptable w.r.t. a set of arguments whenever it is defended by the set, i.e., every argument which attacks ¤ is attacked by an element of the set.
Definition 2 (acceptable sets). Let
A second important notion is the notion of absence of conflicts. Intuitively, two arguments should not be considered together whenever one of them attacks the other one. 
Definition 3 (conflict-free sets

.
The significance of the concept of admissible sets is reflected by the fact that every extension of an argumentation framework under the standard semantics introduced by Dung (preferred, stable, complete and grounded extensions) is an admissible set, satisfying some form of optimality:
be a finite argumentation framework. 
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Among the complete extensions of ¡ ¦ ¢ , the grounded extension of ¡ £ ¢ is the least element w.r.t. set inclusion [5] .
Dung has shown that every argumentation framework 
Dung has also shown that every stable extension is preferred and every preferred extension is complete; however, none of the converse inclusions holds. When all the preferred extensions of an argumentation framework are stable ones, the framework is said to be coherent:
be an argumentation framework.
¡ £ ¢ is coherent if and only if every preferred extension of
Coherence is a desirable property. Dung gave a sufficient condition for it based on the notion of controversial argument:
Definition 9 (controversial arguments).
Let
be an argumentation framework. 
¤ § .
Dung has shown the following theorem:
Proposition 4. Theorem 33 in [5] Every uncontroversial or limited controversial argumentation framework is coherent.
Careful Extensions
Let us now present our new semantics for Dung's argumentation frameworks. They are based on the notion of super-controversial pair of arguments: Obviously, the absence of controversial arguments within a set is only necessary to ensure that the set is controversial-free, hence potentially c-admissible (as Example 1 shows, this is not a sufficient condition). Since every argument belonging to an oddlength cycle of ¡ ¦ ¢ is controversial w.r.t. any argument of the cycle [23] , no such argument can belong to a c-admissible set. In this respect, our approach departs from [18, 19] who consider that odd-length and even-length cycles in an argumentation framework should be handled in the same way.
On this ground, one can define several notions of careful extensions, echoing Dung's ones. Let us start with preferred c-extensions: 
¡ £ ¢ ¢
has no stable c-extension. Every finite argumentation framework has at least one preferred c-extension, and zero, one or many stable c-extensions.
Finally, as for Dung's extensions, we have:
Lemma 2. Every stable c-extension of a finite argumentation framework
¡ £ ¢ also is a preferred c-extension of
¡ £ ¢ . The converse does not hold.
Here is a more complex example for illustrating those notions: One can note that the cautiousness picture for careful inference relations is similar to the one for the inference relations induced from Dung's semantics (assuming that the argumentation frameworks under consideration have stable extension(s)):
Comparisons with Dung's Framework
Let us now compare our careful semantics with Dung's ones. Let us start with a comparison in terms of extensions.
Comparing extensions
First of all, we immediately obtain the following easy result: 
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Clearly, this does not imply that every preferred c-extension is a preferred extension which is conflict-free and controversial-free since maximality w.r.t. set inclusion is required among c-admissible sets. Nevertheless, as a consequence of Proposition 7, we have: 
As a direct consequence, we obtain that every stable c-extension of a finite argumentation framework ¡ £ ¢ also is a preferred extension of ¡ £ ¢ . However, the converse does not hold.
While every well-founded argumentation framework has a stable extension, it is not the case that every well-founded argumentation framework has a stable c-extension; furthermore, it is also not the case that every argumentation framework which is uncontroversial has a stable c-extension. Example 1 is a counter-example for both cases. In the same vein, a finite argumentation framework Thanks to Proposition 4, we obtain the following corollary: Tables 1 and 2 are summarized on Figure 4 (Each arrow can be read as "strictly more cautious than"). . Furthermore, strict cautiousness is a complete ordering over the set of inference relations considered in this paper.
Let us now turn to the general case, i.e., argumentation frameworks which do not have necessarily a stable c-extension, or even a stable extension. We do not put potentially trivial relations into the picture (i.e., Tables 3 and 4 
Some Complexity Issues
Before concluding the paper, let us consider some complexity issues. Indeed, in an AI perspective, it is important to determine how hard are the new inference relations we pointed out w.r.t. the computational point of view. We assume the reader acquainted with basic notions of complexity theory, especially the complexity classes P, NP, coNP and the polynomial hierarchy (see e.g. [24] ).
We have shown in a previous paper [25] that considering sets of arguments (instead of single arguments) as input queries for the inference problem does not lead to a complexity shift when Dung's inference relations are considered (the purpose is to determine whether such sets are derivable from a given finite argumentation framework ¡ £ ¢ ). As to the careful inference relations, the same conclusion can be drawn. First of all, it is easy to show that, given a finite argumentation framework ¡ ¦ ¢ , deciding whether a given argument indirectly attacks (resp. indirectly defends) a given argument is in P, and deciding whether a set of arguments is controversial-free is in P. Accordingly, deciding whether a given set of arguments is c-admissible for ¡ £ ¢ is in P. As a consequence, deciding whether a given set of arguments is a stable c-extension of ¡ £ ¢ is in P as well. Therefore, deciding whether a given set of arguments 
